ABSTRACT Virtual resource arbitration, adjustment, and migration are techniques used by infrastructure providers (InPs) to manage limited resources and maximize revenue by serving as many virtual network operators (VNOs) as possible. However, these techniques tend to violate service level agreements (SLAs) and require InPs to compensate VNOs, resulting in reduced benefits. As reported in the literature, no more than 20% of leased cloud resources are actually used. Therefore, InPs and VNOs can both benefit if some of these resources can be returned to the InPs. In this paper, we model a process for negotiating resource returns using a repeated leader follower game. InP (the leader) offers VNOs (the followers) compensation for returning resources with the objective of creating a pool of resources that can be allocated to other VNOs. In this manner, we can maximize the utility of InP and VNO. In particular, an InP increases utility by increasing its revenue, and VNOs increase their utility because their workload can be completed at a lower price owing to received compensations. We numerically evaluate these utilities using the three strategies that we propose and make comparisons against two conventional strategies. Our three strategies focus on revenue maximization of the InP, preferences of VNOs, and the previous negotiation histories. We observe that, after serving new requests using our first and third proposed strategy, the utility of InP increases by 5% and 13%, respectively, compared with using conventional strategies.
I. INTRODUCTION
Micro datacenters (MDCs) [1] have been included in the cloud computing paradigm to reduce latency by providing computation services close to the customer premises compared to traditional, large datacenters. MDCs have limited physical resources that are typically mounted on a few racks with self-security and disaster protection capabilities. We consider a scenario in which infrastructure providers (InPs) own multiple MDCs placed across several strategic geographic locations to satisfy the demands of customer virtual network operators (VNOs). VNOs lease virtual machines (VMs) on these MDCs, including inter-MDC bandwidth, to provide networking services to application service providers (ASPs) or end users. Each leased VM requires different amounts of computation and bandwidth resources, depending on the function it serves. A common resource management problem in such a scenario is overcommitting,
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where an InP agrees to serve new VNO requests but limited available free resources are insufficient to satisfy these requests [2] . The motivation for InP to engage in overcommitting is to increase revenues obtained from leasing resources.
Virtual resource arbitration, adjustment, and migration are current techniques used by InP to tackle the problems associated with limited resource availability and overcommitting [2] , [3] . However, arbitration and adjustment processes require complicated computing and migration processes result in service disruptions because of the large time duration needed to execute the processes, which in turn require InP to compensate VNOs because of violations in service level agreements (SLA). This compensation could be higher than the revenue earned from serving new VNO requests, leading to reduced utility. Owing to a lack of sufficient information concerning the exact resource requirements, VNOs usually tend to lease extra resources than required (only 10% [4] , or 5%-20% [5] of leased cloud resources are used), resulting in limited resource availability.
In this context, we investigate the manner in which limited physical resources can be better managed by negotiating for mutual benefits of InP and VNOs. An InP with multiple MDCs can increase revenue by increasing resource availability for serving more VNOs, while avoiding operational expenditures for VM migration and SLA violation penalties. We advocate that both InP and VNOs can be mutually beneficial by creating a pool of leased but unused resources through co-operation and dynamic negotiations. VNOs are compensated according to the amount of resources they release, and so their workloads are completed at a lower cost. InP can avoid paying a pre-determined SLA violation penalty [2] , which could be higher than the revenue obtained from serving new VNO requests, through this negotiation and accommodate more resource requests using the resource pool. In this manner, the revenues of InPs can be increased.
To perform such negotiations, we propose a repeated leader follower game, where InP denotes the leader who initiaties the negotiation and the incumbent VNOs denote the followers. At each iteration of the game, the InP first informs the VNOs of the compensation amount per unit resource, as determined by one of our proposed three strategies where InP offers the following:. 1 • The same compensation to all VNOs with proposed strategy 1 (PS1) as the objective of maximizing revenue.
• A different compensation to each VNO with proposed strategy 2 (PS2) based on the preferences of VNOs
• A different compensation to each VNO with proposed strategy 3 (PS3) by considering the transaction histories of previously completed negotiation games with minimal iterations. If the compensation price is acceptable, the VNO responds with the amount of resources it can release and the InP retrieves such resources. Otherwise, the VNO does not respond and the InP continues playing until its target pool has been achieved or a maximum number of iterations have been completed. It must be noted that there is no interaction among the follower VNOs as they exchange information only with the leader InP. Therefore, there is no game played between VNOs.
We define the utility of InP as the revenue earned by leasing resources to incumbent and new VNOs. The utility of an incumbent VNO is defined as the sum of workload completion benefit using leased resources, including received compensation minus the initial resource leasing price. We numerically evaluate improvements in utilities for the InP and VNOs included in our proposed three strategies compared with the two conventional strategies. We observe that, by serving new requests using PS1, the utility of InP increases by 21%, which is 5% and 3% higher than that of the conventional strategy 1 (CS1) and 2 (CS2), respectively. The total utility of the VNOs with PS3 increases by 16%, which is 13% higher than both CS1 and CS2. The utility of InP always increases with PS1 and PS2, but it may decrease with PS3. However, PS3 requires fewer iterations than PS2 and PS3 to complete the negotiation.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses related research on negotiation-based virtual resource management and clarifies our contribution. Section III describes the necessary background concepts and discusses in detail the procedural steps of the proposed repeated game. Numerical evaluation results are discussed in Section V. We present a discussion on the subgame perfect equilibrium of our negotiation game in Section VI. Section VII finally concludes this paper and presents future work.
II. RELATED WORK
Virtual resource negotiations are performed in two situations. First, initial allocation: InP and VNOs negotiate the resource amount, price, and penalty before virtual resources can be allocated. Second, later adjustment: after resources have been allocated, InP adjusts the allocated resources of incumbent VNOs through arbitration and migration according to pre-determined policies or thresholds [2] , [3] .
Before resources can be allocated, both parties (InP and VNOs) generate offers and counteroffers on the desired resource amount and price, and both parties then mutually settle on an initial amount and price [7] - [9] . Resource negotiation policies have been implemented in CloudSim 2 by [8] , [10] and in Haizea 3 framework by [9] , [11] . Initial negotiations have also considered the penalties for parties that break contracts [7] , penalties for cloud users leasing unnecessary large amounts of resources [12] , and SLA violation threshold-based penalties [2] , [13] . Virtual resource negotiation protocols and language syntax for offers and counteroffers have been discussed in [14] and [15] , respectively.
Threshold-based computational resource arbitration and service continuable resource migration has been discussed in [3] . A threshold and multi-agent based negotiation approach associated with physical machines allocated for VM migration and consolidation has been presented in [16] . Threshold-based grid resource negotiation has been addressed in [17] . Resource negotiations have also been employed in several use cases, e.g. among content delivery network operators and InP [18] , stakeholders of heterogeneous wireless networks [19] , support survivability in a multi-domain virtual network embedding [20] , and threshold-based grid resource management [17] .
A combination of economic and social theory-based negotiation methodology, where organizations outsource IT resources to third-party cloud providers, has been presented in [21] . The authors in [21] demonstrated the validity and timeliness of incorporating social exchange, equity, learning, and win-win theories with economic negotiations using rigorous experiments. The survey paper [22] presents a discussion on the recent studies on SLA negotiations. A cloud broker architecture has been presented in [23] , where the broker collects resource information from several cloud providers and dynamically matches user requirements to the available resources. It must be noted that resource limitation was not considered in [23] .
To the best of our knowledge, there is no previous work on dynamic negotiations among the InP and incumbent VNOs for utilizing unused leased virtual resources to address the issue of limited resource availability. An incentive-driven hierarchical leader follower game for a virtual network function service chaining has been presented in [24] . A resource allocation framework was designed in [25] by considering revenue maximization of InP, improvements in energy efficiency, resource utilization, and contract agreements with VNOs. A matching game-based resource allocation and pricing scheme for InP has been presented in [26] . A multiple service radio access network (RAN) slicing problem with limited RAN resources (e.g., base station, cache storage, and backhaul capacity) was formulated as a bi-convex problem by considering the dependencies between resource allocation to each slice and coordination of slices that share the same resources [27] . Motivated by the fact that this type of negotiation can increase the utilities of both InP and VNOs, we model the negotiation among InP and several incumbent VNOs as a repeated leader-follower game, where InP and VNOs cooperate and negotiate for the amount of compensation needed to release unused leased resources. Our proposal helps avoid resource underutilization of VNOs [25] and increases resource availability while not penalizing VNOs for leasing additional resources [12] . Similarly, it also helps an InP to avoid the penalties associated with fixed range-based SLA violations as discussed in [2] .
Initial virtual resource allocation and management among one/multiple InPs and one/multiple VNOs have been investigated in prior studies and we have already cited some of the most relevant studies (e.g., one InP and multiple VNOs [25] , [28] , [30] , [31] , multiple InPs and multiple VNOs [26] , multiple InPs and one VNO [29] ). However, our work presented in this paper is different from the aforementioned studies in several aspects. First, the studies [25] , [26] , [28] - [31] address initial resource allocation among InP(s) and new VNOs; whereas our proposal considers reusing leased but unused resources of incumbent VNOs to tackle limited resource availability and improve resource underutilization. Our numerical evaluation results demonstrate that our proposal can increase the utilities of InP and VNOs, which can be achieved by adopting one of the previous studies on initial resource allocation [25] , [28] , [30] , [31] , by 21% and 16%, 4 respectively. Second, sharing of unused resources has not been considered in [25] , [26] , [28] - [31] . Unused resource sharing among InPs to create a cloud federation, similar to the cloud spot market, was considered in [11] . Third, both cases of mul- 4 Refer to Section V-B for these results.
tiple InP and one VNO and one InP and K VNOs (our case) can be mathematically expressed as one to many relations. However, in the multiple InP and one VNO case (e.g. [29] ), all parties are biased to participate in the resource management process, i.e., the VNO must lease resources from multiple InPs to serve its end users, and InPs must compete to lease the requested resources to earn revenue. In our case, InP collects unused resources from incumbent VNOs to serve requests from new VNOs, while the incumbent VNOs are not forced to compete and release their unused resources. Moreover, in the case of multiple InPs and one VNO, if one of the InP does not include sufficient free resources to meet the demands of the VNO, our proposal presents a solution that addresses this situation.
III. PROPOSED REPEATED LEADER FOLLOWER GAME
In this section, we present a discussion on the system model, utility functions for InP and VNOs before and after negotiations, and elaborate on our proposed repeated leader follower game among InP and VNOs. We then present a discussion on the strategies or actions of each player of the game.
A. SYSTEM MODEL AND PARAMETER DEFINITIONS
The physical resources owned by InP are indicated by an undirected graph G = (V , E), where V is the set of MDCs at strategic geographic locations, and E is the set of inter-MDC links. Let E v ⊂ E denote the set of adjacent inter-MDC links of MDC v ∈ V . The example graph of Fig. 1 Fig. 1 . Each VNO leases a set of VMs with outbound bandwidth requirements across these combinations for a specified duration to provide service to ASPs or end users. Throughout this paper, the word bandwidth in our proposed game explicitly refers to outbound bandwidth. Based on the Amazon EC2 5 model, an InP includes computational resources as VMs, which is a bundle of CPU cores, memory, storage, and bandwidth. A VNO leases one or multiple VMs per MDC. In this paper, we consider only the total allocated number of CPU cores and bandwidth resources to the VMs leased by each VNO.
Let, for each MDC, v ∈ V , c total computed by Eqs. (1) and (2), respectively.
where, c i,v denotes the allocated CPU to VNO i at v ∈ V and b i,e denotes the allocated bandwidth to VNO i at v ∈ V along the adjacent links e ∈ E v , where i = 1, 2, . . . , K , and , computed at T = t 1 , remain unchanged for a duration t 2 − t 1 , where t 2 is the future instant when the resource leasing duration for at least one of the K incumbent VNOs will expire. For a desired usage duration of initially leased resources at MDC v ∈ V , VNO i pays usage fees r i,v and s i,v for each unit of leased CPU core and bandwidth, respectively. Because r i,v and s i,v are different among the incumbent VNOs, this illustrates the fact that each VNO leases resources for different usage durations. Another reason for the difference between r i,v and s i,v across MDCs is the price of electricity in different locations [32] .
Let InP receive M new VNO requests for resource allocation at instant T = t 1 . To satisfy these M requests, InP requires c req v and b req v amount of free resources at MDC v ∈ V and its adjacent links e ∈ E v for a duration t 3 − t 1 , which equals to the minimum desired resource leasing duration among the M requests. It must be noted that, t 1 < t 2 , t 3 and t 2 = t 3 (3) and (4), respectively. For future desired resource usage durations at v ∈ V , a new VNO j will pay usage fees r j,v and s j,v for each unit of leased computation and bandwidth resources, respectively.
The available free CPU cores c avail For each combination, InP iteratively negotiates with K incumbent VNOs to release their unused, leased resources 6 In this paper we use the subscript i to denote the K incumbent VNOs and subscript j to denote the M new VNOs. It must be noted that each new VNO j presents an iteration delay deadline y j , which does not change with l. If InP can pool the necessary resources from incumbent VNOs within y j negotiation iterations, VNO j's delay deadline can be satisfied.
In this paper, we focus only on the aggregate amount of required resources (c 
B. UTILITIES FOR INP AND INCUMBENT VNOS
InP's utility U 1,v , defined by Eq. (5), for initial resource allocation denotes the revenue earned by leasing resources to K incumbent VNOs.
InP's utility U 2,v , defined by Eq. (6), for resource negotiation is the difference between the revenue earned by leasing resources to M new VNO requests and the total compensation paid to the K incumbent VNOs to pool the required amount of unused leased resources.
where, the first two terms of the right side, denoted collectively as U 21,v The multipliers of the first and second terms, 1,v and 2,v , for all v ∈ V are defined using Eq. (7) and Eq. (8), respectively. If the collected CPU pool size is equal to or higher than the required amount, 1,v = 1, otherwise 1,v < 1. Similarly, if the collected bandwidth pool size is equal to or higher than the required amount, 2,v = 1, otherwise 2,v < 1. The third and fourth terms include two summations. The range of outer summation indicates the total number of negotiation rounds (x).
A value less than one for both 1,v and 2,v indicates the fact that it is not always possible to pool the required amount of resources through negotiations. The total utility W 1,v for K incumbent VNOs, because of initial resource leasing, is defined using Eq. (9):
where, the first term of the right side indicates the sum of each VNO's individual utilities, i.e. profit, for leasing and utilizing CPU cores at v ∈ V for up to the instant T = t 1 minus the payment for leasing CPU to InP. Similarly, the second term on the right side denotes the sum of each VNO's individual utilities, i.e. profit, for leasing and utilizing bandwidth along the adjacent links e ∈ E v of v ∈ V for up to the instant T = t 1 minus the payment for leasing bandwidth to InP. In the first and second terms, f i,v and g i,v denote unit gains, expressed in the same unit of r i,v and r i,v [33] , of VNO i for leasing and utilizing computational and bandwidth resources at v ∈ V , including its corresponding adjacent links, respectively. The utility W 1,v must always be positive. Therefore, f i,v and g i,v must satisfy the relations:
The total utility of negotiation W 2,v , defined by Eq. (10), for the K VNOs equals the total compensation paid back by the InP for releasing their unused leased resources.
C. DETAILS OF THE GAME BETWEEN INP AND VNOS
We model the negotiation process among the InP and K incumbent VNOs using a repeated leader follower game. We assume that the leader InP simultaneously offers compensation prices to K VNOs, and there exists no interactions among these VNOs. Each VNO exchanges information only with the InP. At each negotiation stage, the leader InP increases compensation prices according to one of our three proposed strategies to induce K VNOs to release unused leased resources. Our proposed game repeats until one of the three terminating conditions (C 1 , C 2 , or C 3 ) is satisfied. The stage game, which indicates the actions of InP and VNOs that are repeated at each iteration are described below. We present the pseudocode of our proposed game in Fig. 2 . The actions and strategies of both InP and VNOs are discussed in the following paragraphs with reference to the line number of the pseudocode shown in Fig. 2 .
Actions of InP: At each stage l InP offers compensation prices r l i,v and s l i,v (line 5), defined by Eqs. (11) and (12), per unit of released computation and bandwidth resources to K incumbent VNOs. InP follows three strategies to increase the compensation prices r l i,v , and s l i,v to the VNOs. The strategies are descried as follows.
PS1: In this strategy, we consider InP to be risk averse and sensitive to revenue loss. Therefore, InP adopts an explorative approach by offering the same compensation to all VNOs with small increments in each round. The aim of InP is to provide the least possible compensation. Recall that x is the maximum number of negotiations that InP intends to perform. InP proposes a compensation price based on the following increments, which are defined by Eq. (13), to all VNOs;
To ensure that U 2,v is positive, the offered compensation prices r l i,v and s l i,v , as a guideline, should not exceed the average resource prices of the new requests because InP offers the same compensation to all incumbent VNOs. The conditions of Eq. (14) should be satisfied to ensure U 2,v > 0.
PS2: In this strategy, we consider that InP does not mind risking revenue loss and wants to complete negotiations as soon as possible. InP adopts an exploitation approach by considering the preferences of both incumbent VNOs and new VNOs to reduce the number of negotiations compared to PS1. For each VNO i, InP determines the increments according to Eq. (15) .
where, α = 
• For negotiation rounds l ≥2 of the current game, determine the increments using Eq. (16) .
One question may arise ''Why is a curve fitting-based strategy not adopted for InP?'' Curve fitting with linear equations can cause generally large errors or fluctuations as the selection of each VNO varies depending on the situation in which it is placed, as described in the next paragraph. Therefore, by using a curve fitting-based increment approach, there exists a possibility of predicting a large increment value that may result in revenue losses for InP. Therefore, we do not adopt curve fitting in our strategies. [34] . In this manner, VNOs are simultaneously compensated when they use resources compared to Amazon EC2 or Google compute engine 7 services, where compensations are paid only at the next usage cycle. Our consideration is also more attractive for VNOs who lease resources only once. 
Actions of K Incumbent

IV. CONVENTIONAL STRATEGIES AND QUALITY OF EXPERIENCE
B. DETERMINING TOTAL UTILITIES FOR THE PROPOSED AND CONVENTIONAL STRATEGIES
In this paper, we focus on observing the manner in which the negotiation utility W 2,v affects InP's total utility U 1,v + U 2,v , including K VNOs total utility v (W 1,v + W 2,v ), where v ≤ 1 is a multiplier parameter associated with the quality of experience (QoE). For PS1, PS2, and PS3, the utility U 2,v is affected by the total amount of available unused CPU and bandwidth resources through the multipliers 1,v ≤ 1 and 2,v ≤ 1, respectively, as explained in Section IV-B. However, the QoE of the incumbent VNOs is unaffected by PS1, PS2, and PS3 because the allocated resources are reduced by InP with the consent of VNOs. Therefore, v is always equal to 1 for PS1, PS2, and PS3. In the case of CS1 and CS2, InP always takes away the required amount of resources without VNO's consent [2] , and so 1,v and 2,v always equal to 1 for CS1 and CS2. For the same reason, the QoE of each VNO i will also be affected, including v ≤ 1 for CS1 and CS2. We present a discussion on the derivation of parameters v for CS1 and CS2 as follows.
There are two approaches to measuring QoE: measurement based and feedback based [35] , [36] . In the first approach, QoE is measured by monitoring network technical parameters such as throughput, delay, and packet loss. In other approaches, QoE is evaluated by real users in terms of mean opinion score (MOS). Therefore, we introduce the multiplier v to compute the total utility of the incumbent VNOs after negotiating v × (W 1,v + W 2,v ). The multiplier v denotes the MOS for K VNOs and is defined by Eq. 17.
where, φ c i,v and φ b i,v denote the opinion scores for VNO i in response to InP's reduced allocation of CPU resources and bandwidth at v ∈ V , respectively, and 0 < v ≤ 1. Greater the reduction in the amount of allocated resources, lower the value of v and vice versa. v > 0 because an incumbent VNO i leased and utilized resources for some time before the resources were reduced by InP according to CS1 or CS2. We define φ c i,v and φ b i,v using Eq. (18) and Eq. (19), respectively. , respectively, the QoE must be a monotonically decreasing function according to the amount of resource reduction [37] , and an exponential function is better suited to compute the QoE [35] .
A question arises of what should be a good approximation of the ratio
. QoE is affected by the amount of resources allocated to the desired service [37] and its price [38] . In our negotiation scenario, allocated resource reduction deteriorates QoE, and the provided compensation or SLA violation penalty [2] 
V. NUMERICAL EVALUATION
We numerically evaluate the compensations W 2,v paid by InP to K incumbent VNOs according to five strategies (CS1, CS2, PS1, PS2, PS3) and observe the manner in which these compensations affect the total after negotiation utilities of InP U 1,v + U 2,v and K incumbent VNOs v (W 1,v + W 2,v ). We consider the complete range of (0.01,1.0) for R c,v , R b,v , yielding 100 different resource pool sizes that satisfy the CPU and bandwidth requirements of M new VNO requests. It must be noted that in the graphs, R c,v and R b,v are denoted as percentages along the X-axis. In addition to utilities, we also investigate the number of iterations required to complete negotiations, including the amount of collected CPU and bandwidth pool size for our three proposed strategies.
A. SIMULATION PARAMETERS AND VALUES
We execute simulations for one MDC, including its adjacent links only. We consider a typical 42 rack unit (RU) MDC with 40 RU servers and 2 RU switches. 8 Each RU server employs 40 CPU cores (e.g. Dell PowerEdge R930 9 with two Intel Xeon E7-8870 v4 processor), totaling 1600 CPU cores. Each RU switch includes a 10 Gigabit ethernet uplink to the Internet, totaling a bandwidth of 20,000 Mbps for MDC. The parameters and the corresponding values used for numerical simulation are summarized in Table 1 . We assume 
B. EXPLORATIONS OF TRENDS AND HIDDEN POINTS 1) UTILITY CHANGES FOR INP
The normalized utilities of InP (
10 in terms of the five evaluated strategies are illustrated in Fig. 3 . The Y-axis value = 1 in Fig. 3 corresponds to U 1,v . A Y-axis value greater than 1 indicates that U 2,v is positive, and in the opposite case, U 2,v is negative. A similar explanation is applicable to Fig. 5 where we illustrate the utilities of K VNOs.
After serving new requests and paying compensations, the normalized (average/maximum/minimum) utilities of InP over the 100 combinations with CS1, CS2, PS1, PS2, and PS3 are (1.16/1.36/1.01), (1.18/1.26/1.01), (1.21/1.27/1.01), (1.19/1.25/1.0), and (1.13/1.2/0.88), respectively. The average utility of InP increases by up to 21% for PS1 and decreases by up to 12% for PS3, as illustrated in Fig. 3 . The utility of InP with PS1 is always higher than PS2 and PS3. Normalized utility with PS1 and PS2 are always higher than 1, however small, which reflects InP's risk averse attitude for negotiations, while up to 12% (Yaxis value = 0.88) utility loss with PS3 indicates InP's risk neutral approach toward negotiations. After R c,v = R b,v = 50%, utility loss with PS1, PS2, and PS3 almost remains constant. This is because the maximum amount of free unused resources remains almost constant as shown in Fig. 4 .
The profit curve for CS2 in Fig. 3 follows the curve for PS1 for up to 60% of the X-axis value. However, beyond this point, the amount of compensation increases drastically (more will be discussed in Fig. 8 ), resulting in rapid profit reductions. The curve for CS1 in Fig. 3 follows a sawtooth and step shape that reflects the five ranges of compensation for CS1. Within a range, e.g., 40% to 59%, InP does not increase the compensation amount; however, it can take back any amount of resources from 40% up to 59% of the allocated resources and serve new requests. Therefore, within the range, InP's profit increases linearly. After 60%, the compensation again increases and causes an instant drop in InP's utility. ) are presented in Fig. 4 . A Y-axis value ≥ 1 indicates that the collected amount of CPU resources is equal to or higher than the required amount as long as the available unused resources are sufficient (indicated by Available CPU curve in Fig. 4) . This is because in the last negotiation round, InP pools resources from all willing incumbent VNOs. Consequently, several free CPU cores become available after serving the current M requests, which increases resource availability for future resource requests. Because of additional resources in always equals 1 for CS1 and CS2, and so it is not plotted in Fig. 4 .
Until R c,v = R b,v = 47% the available unused free resources are higher than the required amount, and InP cannot determine the exact available amount. When the available amount is less than c req v , InP can learn of the exact available amount after completing negotiations with the terminating condition C 2 . In either case, no incumbent VNO i can determine the exact available amount of CPU resources.
In our experiment, bandwidth resources follow the same trend as illustrated in Fig. 4 , and so we do not include the graph of the bandwidth. We can change the point where the curves cross the value 1 (e.g. R c = R b = 47% in Fig. 4 ), by setting a strict constraint on the ratios ≥ 0.6. In this case, the curves of PS1, PS2, and PS3 in Fig. 4 will cross the Y-axis value 1 at R c = R b = 60% and will then become constant. This strict constraint increases the simulation execution time because the randomly generated c l i,v , b l i,e numbers must satisfy this constraint. Therefore, to avoid delays, we do not include this strict condition in our evaluation.
3) UTILITY CHANGES FOR K VNOS
The normalized utilities of K VNOs ( v (W 1,v + W 2,v )) for the 100 combinations of R c,v = R b,v in terms of the five evaluated strategies are illustrated in Fig. 5 . The Y-axis value = 1 in Fig. 5 corresponds to W 1,v . A Y-axis value greater than 1 indicates that W 2,v is positive. If no VNO participates in the negotiation, W 2,v = 0 for PS1, PS2, and PS3. Therefore, the curves corresponding to PS1, PS2, and PS3 will remain at or above the Y-axis value 1. However, because of the degradation of QoE with CS1 and CS2, the curves corresponding to CS1 and CS2 may be below the Y-axis value < 1. After releasing unused leased resources and receiving compensations, the normalized (average/maximum/minimum) total utilities of K VNOs over the 100 combinations with CS1, CS2, PS1, PS2, and PS3 are (1.03/1.13/0.98), (1.03/1.05/1), (1.1/1.16/1.0), (1.12/1.17/1.0), and (1.16/ 1.2/1.08), respectively. The average utility of VNOs increases by up to 16% for PS3, which is the highest among the five strategies, while the utility increase for CS1 and CS2 is only 3%. The utility of VNOs with PS1 is always lower than those of PS2 and PS3, which reflects InP's risk averse attitude for negotiations with PS1, while up to 12% and 16% utility gain for VNOs with PS2 and PS3, respectively. This indicates InP's risk neutral approach toward negotiations. Similar to InP, the utility of K VNOs based on three proposed strategies does not increase after R c,v = R b,v = 50% because of the fact that no unused resources are available for the target pool beyond this point.
The average utility of CS2 is 7%-13% less than the proposed strategies, but it never goes below the Y-axis value 1. The curve for CS1 in Fig. 5 follows a sawtooth shape that crosses the curve of CS1 several times. There are five interval changes of R c,v = R b,v with CS1, and the curve of CS1 touches or crosses the curve of CS2 at these five points. After each interval change, the utility of CS1 decreases linearly until the next interval because of v , and decreases below the value of 1 three times.
4) REQUIRED NUMBER OF NEGOTIATION ITERATIONS
The total number of negotiation iterations required for the three proposed strategies are illustrated in Fig. 6 . The (average/maximum/minimum) number of negotiation iterations required over the 100 R c,v = R b,v combinations with PS1, PS2, and PS3 are (1113.36/1591.03/64.12), (13.38/16 .78/2.07), and (11.59/16.58/1.0), respectively. PS1, PS2, and PS3 require 1, 2, and 64 iterations, 11 respectively, when the required resource pool size is minimum (i.e. R c,v = R b,v = 1%). The number of required negotiations 11 We present the nearest integer number for iteration by using floor function. with three strategies remains constant after R c,v = R b,v = 50% because beyond this point, the amount of resources available becomes less than the required amount. In addition, the negotiation is terminated when condition C 2 is satisfied. The required number of iterations for PS3 is always less than or equal to that of PS2, while for PS1, it is up to 95 (≈ 1591 16 ) times higher than both PS2 and PS3. The number of required iterations with PS1 can be reduced by decreasing the value of x in Eq. (13) . It must be noted that for CS1 and CS2, there is no negotiation, and so the number of iterations is equal to zero. Fig. 7 . The Y-axis value = 1 indicates that the amounts of compensation and revenue are equal. It is desirable that
5) AMOUNT OF COMPENSATION
always < 1 such that InP always exhibits positive utility U 2,v . This is true for PS1 and PS2, indicating that negotiations are always beneficial for InP in terms of increased revenue. For PS3, the ratio is higher than 1 for up to R c,v = R b,v = 13%, which indicates that PS3 is not profitable for InP when the required resource pool is small. Following this, it remains below 1 and is therefore profitable for InP. Up to R c,v = R b,v = 60%, compensation W 2,v , and
, for CS1 and CS2 is less than or equal to that of PS1, PS2, and PS3. In the worst case, resource reduction 21,v for CS1 and CS2 ≈ 1, which indicates no profit increase with CS1 and CS2.
The value of VNOs initial profit W 1,v with CS1 and CS2 should be such that when all resources are considered by InP without VNOs consent, the after negotiation utility v (W 1,v + W 2,v ) with either CS1 and CS2 should be less than or marginally higher than W 1,v . As discussed in section IV-B, the ratio
must be equal to or less than the MOS of 12 Please refer to Eq. (6) for details about U 21 . 
VI. SUBGAME PERFECT EQUILIBRIUM
In the literature, the equilibrium of a leader-follower game is defined by the Nash equilibrium. Because our proposed repeated game includes one leader InP and K follower VNOs, the subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE), a refinement of conventional Nash equilibrium, is used to describe the equilibrium of the subgame played between InP and each VNO i in each round of negotiation l. Each subgame of a finitely repeated game must include a unique SPE [39] . For each subgame, InP can choose one strategy from PS1, PS2, or PS3 to decide on the increments of compensation price. VNO i includes two choices: release resources or wait for a higher compensation price. Because, InP cannot change the compensation price after VNO i has released resources and because VNO i is not allowed to release resources more than once, the component equilibrium can be reached for each subgame of the VNO i. In our proposed repeated game, the overall equilibrium is reached when InP terminates the game upon satisfying one of the three conditions C 1 , C 2 , or C 3 as described in Section III-C. It must be noted that, condition C 2 ensures that all subgames between InP and K VNOs have reached the equilibrium because each VNO has released resources. For conditions C 1 and C 3 , this is not always ensured because InP terminates the game before all K VNOs have released resources.
In a single leader multiple followers Stackelberg game, the leader anticipates the responses of multiple followers and decides his/her best strategy. After observing the leader's action, the followers compete among themselves to determine their best responses [40] . In our game, after the leader InP decides the compensation price, the follower VNO does not decide on a price but takes action of undermentioned 'Wait' or 'Immediate release.' We refer to our game as a leader-follower game rather than a pure Stackelberg game.
To determine the SPE, we must consider the subgame played between InP and individual VNO i. We represent the subgame in extensive form, and employ the backward induction method to determine the SPE. Prior to representing the subgame in extensive form, we must define the utilities of the possible actions of InP and each VNO i in the game.
InP's possible actions in the subgame, where InP offers compensation to each of the K VNOs with one of our three proposed strategies, including their corresponding utilities are defined in Table 2 .
Each VNO i first observes InP's adopted action in the subgame and then decides its action. Therefore, the utility of VNO i will depend on the action InP chooses as a leader. Each VNO includes two possible actions: 'wait' or 'immediate release'. 1) Wait: in this strategy VNO i waits for the increase in offered compensations so that its willingness ratios w c i,v and w b i,v are satisfied. Therefore, VNO i does not release resources at the current round l despite having resources that can be released. 2) Immediate release: VNO i returns unused resources in the current negotiation round l irrespective of the offered compensation. The utility of these two actions, w.r.t. InP's adopted strategy, are defined in Table 3 . Table 4 .
From the utility values in Table 4 , we compute a 1 + b 1 = 2.31, a 2 +b 2 = 2.31, and a 3 +b 3 = 2.29. We include the same total sum of utilities when InP starts with a 1 or a 2 . A large number of negotiations l is required in case InP chooses a 1 , while for a 2 l is small. According to the results presented in Fig. 6 , we can state that if l ≤ 17, a 2 + b 2 results in a SPE, in the opposite case, when l > 17, a 1 + b 1 leads to SPE.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We modeled virtual resource negotiation among InP and several incumbent VNOs in a limited resource availability situation by using a repeated game. At each negotiation iteration of the repeated game, InP adopts one of our proposed three strategies, focusing on utility increases of InP, preferences of incumbent and new VNOs, and previous negotiation histories, respectively. This is done to offer compensation to the incumbent VNOs for releasing unused leased resources such that InP can satisfy new VNO requests from the collected pool of released resources. We numerically evaluated improvements in the utilities for InP and VNOs that have been provided by our proposed three strategies and compared them against the two conventional strategies. We observed that by serving new requests and by using the proposed strategy 1, the utility of InP increases by up to 21%, which is up to 5% higher than that of conventional strategies. The utility increase of VNOs based on the proposed strategy 3 is 16%, which is 13% higher than the utilities achieved by both conventional strategies. The utility of InP always increases with the proposed strategy 1 and 2 but decreases by up to 12% with strategy 3 when the amount of resources to be pooled are less than 10%. On the other hand, strategy 2 (16.5 iterations) can approach the optimal compensation price using the 1 95 th iteration of strategy 1 (1501 iterations). We also presented a discussion on the actions of InP and incumbent VNOs that result in subgame perfect equilibrium.
As future work, we will integrate the negotiation procedure presented in this paper with other elastic resource adaptation approaches [41] such that they assume the virtual network controller role of the game presented here with the additional knowledge that these approaches possess. 
